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Following Basu’s (1995, 1997) seminal work1, accounting literature adopted the Basu coefficient to 
measure conditional conservatism (among others, Ball et l. 2003; Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2005; Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005; Lobo and Zhou 2006; Chandra et al. 2004). However, Basu’s choice of proxy for 
measuring the arrival of good/bad news, stock returns, introduces inaccuracy in the measure of 
conditional conservatism (Dietrich et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; Givoly et al. 2007).   
To address the problem, I introduce a new measure of conditional conservatism, which results from a 
Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression and adopts the number of changes in financial 
analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for good/bad news about future earnings and extends the analysis to 
two-year and three-year time horizons.   
I use this new measure to test three determinants tha  prior literature suggested to explain the presence 
of accounting conservatism.  Results show that companies with (1) high debt-to-assets ratio – closer to 
default on their debt covenants, with large portion f executives’ compensation tied to the firm’s 
performance, and in the year prior to a going concern opinion from their auditors report aggressively, 
recognizing future good news in annual earnings more quickly than bad news.  
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1 As of October 1, 2007, 120 citations for Basu (1997) are recorded on Thomson ISI’s Social Sciences Citation 





The conservative principle, defined as the more timly recognition of unrealized losses vs. gains in 
annual earnings, has characterized for centuries th practice of accounting reporting (Basu 1997).  
Despite its widespread adoption over time and in different countries, however, the concept is 
somewhat counter-intuitive.  Why do we have rules mandating the prompt recognition of expected 
losses, but delay the recognition of gains until they are (1) realized or realizable and (2) earned2?  
Instead, would a timely recognition of all the available news be more informative to users of financial 
statements, and thus preferred?  Indeed, recently the US Financial Accounting Standard Board 
(FASB), jointly with the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), stated: 
Neutrality is incompatible with conservatism, which implies a bias in financial reporting 
information. […] Conservative or otherwise biased financial reporting information is equally 
unacceptable.3 
 
This issue has been the basis for eminent academic r search since Basu’s influential work (Givoly 
et al. 2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; LaFond and Watts 2007; Guay 2006; Ryan 2006; Choi et 
al. 2006; Guay and Verrecchia 2006; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Watts 2003a, 2003b; Ryan and 
Zarowin 2003).  Indeed, the understanding of the motivations and determinants of conditional 
conservatism is central to gaining insights in the role of financial reporting in debt contracting, 
managerial compensation, firm valuation, and institutional settings.   
However, many important questions remain unanswered and more empirical issues need to be 
addressed.  Has the analysis of conditional conservatism been exhaustive in identifying all the factors 
that might explain its widespread adoption?  Is Basu’s coefficient the appropriate measure of 
                                                
2 FASB Concept Statement No. 5.  
3 FASB, Preliminary Views, Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting: Objective of Financial Reporting and 
Qualitative Characteristics of Decision-Useful Financi l Reporting Information, July 6, 2006, No. 1260-001, p. 29, 
underlying added.  
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conditional conservatism to study its variation over time, firms, and countries?  The term timeliness 
refers to the interval of time that intercurs between the time a given piece information – news - about a 
firm’s future increase/decrease in earnings become available and the time the same information 
appears in the firm’s periodic financial statements.  Prior research found an asymmetric difference in 
the information timeliness, conditionally to its content: good news (i.e., information associated with a 
future increase in earnings) takes longer than bad news (i.e., information associated with a future 
decrease in earnings) to appear in the firm’s financial statements.   
The empirical problem is that it is not possible to track directly each single piece of public 
information about a company.  Researchers need to find a measurable and observable variable to use as 
a proxy.  So far, following Basu, many researchers adopted stock returns as a proxy to measure the 
public flow of firms’ good/bad news.  Specifically, Basu uses “negative and positive unexpected 
annual stock returns to proxy for 'bad news' and 'good news', respectively” (1997).  If the price of the 
stock at the end of a period is greater than the price at the beginning of the period, then Basu assume  
that over the period good news (somehow quantified) about the company is greater than bad news.  
Despite its widespread adoption, as recent literature highlights, there are economic and 
econometric limits of Basu’s model and measure of conservatism (Dietrich et al. 2007; Givoly et al. 
2007; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).  The problems stem from the choice of stock returns as proxy 
for good/bad news.  Many of the factors that trigger a reaction in Basu’s proxy variable– i.e. stock 
price increases or decreases - are related to events that a firm’s accounting system cannot and will not 
record, because general market factors, or because not associated with the firm’s under analysis.  
Hence, they will not appear as an increase or decrease of earnings in the firm’s actual financial 
statement, nor will it happen in the future.  These “non accounting” factors act only as a disturbance 
term – noise – in the attempt to measure the differential timeliness of good/bad news about the firm’s 
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future earnings, introducing a noisy signal in the m asure of asymmetric timeliness, hence in the 
measure of conditional conservatism (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).4 
To reduce the noise, hence increasing the accuracy of the measure, I propose to adopt the number 
of revisions in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a new proxy of the flow of good/bad news about a 
company.  Financial analysts gather all available information, but use only the part that is going to be 
recognized in future earnings (Nichols and Wahlen 2004) to revise their EPS estimates.5  Acting as a 
filter, analysts reduce the noise that characterizes stock returns as a proxy for good/bad news.  The new 
proxy, able to capture the arrival of good and bad “accounting6” news about the firm’s future earnings, 
together with the use of a Lease Absolute Deviation (LAD) regression and the extension of the analysis 
time horizon to three years will result in a more pcise, a priori, measure of conditional conservatism.  
Once I demonstrate that this measure of asymmetric timeliness is, a priori, less noisy (thus more 
precise), I can test whether determinants suggested by previous literature - managerial, debt 
contracting, and auditor’s choice - are still able to explain the reasons for conditional conservatism.  I 
test (1) whether companies with a higher debt-to-asset ratio, where bondholders detain more power, are 
characterized by higher conditional conservatism.  Next, I test (2) whether companies in which 
executives’ compensation is more heavily based on firms’ accounting performances are characterized 
by higher conditional conservatism.  Finally, I test (3) whether there is an association between auditors, 
auditor opinions, and the company’s lagged conditional conservatism.  
                                                
4 Let’s assume, for example, that over a given period there is only one piece of information about firm A’s future 
earnings, and that the content of the information suggests that firm A’s earnings will grow in the next period (for instance, a 
positive net present value project that firm A will start in the following period).  If in the current period the market 
experiences a decrease, then the variable adopted as a proxy for good/bad news flow – stock returns – might also decrease, 
suggesting the arrival of a flow of bad news for firm A.  Instead, the only real “accounting” news about firm A is good 
news.  In the following period firm A will recognize the increase of earnings in its financial statement coming from the 
positive NPV project, but the traditional conservatism model will not be able to measure the timeliness of good news, 
because the proxy variable adopted signaled the arrival of bad news instead.   
5 I adopt here the three theoretical links between ear ings and share prices developed by Beaver (1998): current period 
earnings provide information to predict the future periods’ earnings, which provide information to forecast dividends in 




Results of the paper provide evidence supporting the results obtained adopting a modified version 
of the Basu’s measure (Ball and Kothari 2007; Roychwdhury and Watts 2007), indirectly confuting 
the conceptual and econometric criticism to the Basu’s model, mainly by Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl 
(2007).  More specifically, the paper provides evidnce that that (1) companies characterized by a high 
debt-to-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future earnings as quickly as 
bad news.  These companies, which are closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low 
leverage ratio, are more likely to take higher risks and “manage” earnings through a relatively faster 
recognition of expected gains (good news), in order to reduce the chances of defaulting the 
requirements of debt indentures, thus reducing the asymmetric timeliness that I find for the rest of the 
sample.  Additionally, (2) companies with executives compensations more heavily based on the 
company’s accounting performances do consistently exhibit aggressive accounting, defined as 
expected gains recognized in annual earnings faster than losses.  This provide evidence consistent with
a relative higher power of the firm’s executives (who have incentives to adopt aggressive accounting to 
increase an annual compensation package based on the firm’s accounting performance) over 
shareholders, who have incentives to enforce conservative accounting to reduce the chances of 
overpaying the firm’s management.  Furthermore, (3a) companies that in the previous year were 
audited by one of the big 7 auditing firms, and (3b) firms that received an unqualified auditor opinion 
show a higher conditional conservative behavior than the rest of the sample.  Finally, over a reduced 
sample of 6,282 firm-year observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors’ opinion qualified 
with a going concern assumption applied aggressive accounting in the year prior to the going concern 
opinion but became highly conservative in the year the qualified opinion was issued and the following 
year.  Significantly, during the year of the going concern opinion and the following year, these firms 
turned around to adopt conservative accounting, even stronger than the other firms in the sample.  
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The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews prior research.  Chapter 3 describes the 
hypotheses tested in the paper. Chapter 4 provides a short description of the sample and details its 
descriptive statistics.  Chapter 5 outlines the resarch design and provides results.  Chapter 6 performs 
some sensitivity analyses.  Chapter 7 concludes and points to future avenues for research. 
 
2. Prior Research 
2.1 Conservatism Determinants 
Previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2007; Watts 2003a; Ball et al. 2005) suggests five 
alternative explanations for conservatism in financi l reporting.  The first explanation is its use as 
efficient technology employed in firm governance.  A conservative accounting approach is used to deal 
with the moral hazard determined by the asymmetric information, limited liability, and asymmetric 
payoffs of the different parties involved in the firms, e.g. management compensation and debt 
contracts.  The second possible explanation for accounting conservatism is limiting shareholders’ 
litigation.  Overstating a firm’s net assets is more likely to increase the litigation costs for the firm than 
understating net assets.  Thus, with conservatism, the firm reduces its expected litigation costs.  The 
third possible explanation is taxation; in profitable firms, conservatism reduces the present value of 
taxes7, thus increasing the value of the firm.  The fourth possible explanation of conservatism in 
financial reporting is standard setters’ and regulators’ incentives. Both standard setters and regulators 
are exposed to asymmetric loss functions because they would be more criticized if they adopt 
accounting standards that favor overstatement of net assets instead of understatement of net assets.  
Finally, the fifth reason for conservatism in financial accounting is theoretically introduced and 
                                                
7 Deferring revenues recognition and accelerating expenses recognition. 
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empirically tested recently by LaFond and Watts (2007)8.  They argue that conditional conservatism 
may serve as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce the information asymmetry among the 
various parties (managers, shareholders, investors, stakeholders in general) involved in firms’ 
contracts, litigation, taxation, and regulation processes.  Much of the information asymmetry arises 
from the firm’s investment opportunity sets, but it also occurs because of the way the firm’s 
management, more informed about events and investment opportunities, formally collects and reports 
information to stakeholders.  The two common denomiator factors in the economic explanation of 
accounting conditional conservatism are the asymmetry of both the loss functions and information sets 
that characterize the different categories of stakeholders.  
 
2.2 Empirical Research Results 
Basu (1997, 1995) tests conditional conservatism by regressing annual accounting earnings on 
stock returns for the same year separately for companies with negative returns and positive returns, 
adopting returns as a proxy for bad/good news.  He predicts, and actually finds, a higher coefficient 
and a higher R square for the bad news sample than for the good news sample.  Following Basu 
(1997), a great body of literature analyzing accounting conservatism adopted his framework in 
identifying and measuring conditional conservatism in its most important consequence, namely the 
asymmetric timeliness of expected gains and losses in reported earnings. 
Among the early researchers, Ryan and Zarowin (2003) investigate the reasons for a decline in the 
linear relation between annual stock returns and accounting earnings over the past 30 years.  They 
                                                
8 LaFond and Watts adopt the PIN score developed by Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) to proxy for equity investors 
asymmetric information.  The PIN score is the probability of an information-based trade derived from a structural market 
microstructure model and it has been adopted by numerous papers to capture the difference in the information asymmetries 
between informed and uninformed investors.  
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found evidence supporting two related explanations: 1) earnings reflect news with a lag with respect to 
stock prices, and 2) earnings increasingly over time reflect good and bad news in an asymmetric way.   
On the same issue Pope and Walker (1999) present evidence of growing asymmetry over time in 
accounting earnings.  
More recently, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) propose a theory and provide supporting 
empirical results to explain the relation between asymmetric timeliness (conditional conservatism) and
market-to-book ratio (unconditional conservatism).  When returns are driven by changes in rents and 
unverifiable net assets changes, then the measure of conservatism introduced by Basu (1997) is not 
very accurate.  Roychowdhury and Watts suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of 
conservatism when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple years.  
Ryan (2006) argues that, despite the limitations documented in the literature and highlighted at the 
end of this section, asymmetric timeliness is the most direct consequence of conditional conservatism.  
Hence, asymmetric timeliness should retain its primacy in the literature investigating conditional 
conservatism.  The author offers four specific suggestions for estimating asymmetric timeliness and for 
interpreting it as a measure of conditional conservatism.  Among them, Ryan (2006) suggests to filter 
returns when they are used as a proxy to assess asymmetric timeliness, in order to mitigate the proxy 
biases arising from sampling of an endogenous variable. (Dietrich et al. 2007).   
Lobo et al. (Lobo and Zhou 2006) document an increase in conservatism in financial reporting after 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002.9  Others (Ball et al. 2000; Givoly and Hayn 
2000; Ryan and Zarowin 2003) offer consistent evidence that the asymmetric timeliness series varies 
across time and explaining the variation with changes in legal liability.   
                                                
9 SOX, among other requirements, provide that CEOs and CFOs certify the firm’s financial statements. 
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Moreover, many papers in this stream of literature p sent evidence of a positive association 
between accounting conservatism and: 
- U.S. high-tech firms (Chandra et al. 2004), because they are subject to more stringent accounting 
standards (SFAS 2) and higher shareholders’ litigaton risk;  
- public and larger firms in the U.K. (Ball and Shivakumar 2005); 
- firms audited by one of the Big “X” (Krishnan 2005), with longer auditor tenure (Jenkins and Velury 
2006), after an audit partner rotation (Hamilton et al. 2005) and with the accounting expertise (but not 
with non-accounting expertise) of the audit committee members (Krishnan and Gnanakumar 2006). 
Starting with the critique that Basu’s approach lacks an equilibrium pricing model,  Callen, Hope et 
al. (2005) approach the study of conservatism in accounting by adopting the Callen and Segal asset 
pricing model (2004).  This model expresses unexpected hanges in stock returns as a function of 
unexpected changes in accruals (accruals news), unexpected shocks to current and expected future cash 
flow (cash flow news), and expected return (discount rate).  They find empirical evidence of a 
significant increasing concave relation between unexpected changes in stock returns and earnings 
news.10   
Dietrich et al. (Dietrich et al. 2007) criticize the use of the asymmetric timeliness measure to test 
the hypothesis that reported accounting earnings are “conservative.”  The authors identify econometric 
properties of the asymmetric timeliness estimation procedure that cause biases in the test statistics, 
unless restrictive conditions are met.  These biases rise from the sampling formation procedure on an 
endogenous variable11 - returns - and the consequent distributional prope ties of the truncated sample.  
They conclude that because the biases originate in the asymmetric timeliness specification design 
itself, alternative measures such as negative non-operating accruals (Givoly and Hayn 2000), market-
                                                
10 The model assumes earning news equal to the sum of cash flow news and accruals news.  
11 Returns, indeed, can be affected by earning information, generating endogeneity in the Basu regression.  
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to-book ratio (Feltham and Ohlson 1995), and change i  cash investments (Easton and Pae 2004) 
should be adopted to further investigate accounting conservatism.  
 
2.3 Adoption of Number of Analysts’ EPS Estimate Revisions as a Replacement of Market Returns 
Proxy  
To measure conditional conservatism I will adopt Basu’s definition - the accountants’ tendency to 
require a higher degree of verification for the recognition of good news in earnings than bad news - 
within the framework based on the theory of conservatism in accounting illustrated by Watts (2003b, 
2003a) and Roychowdhury and Watts (2007)12.    
However, following Basu and using stock returns as a proxy for good and bad news about firms’ 
future earnings creates two main economic and econometric problems.   
First, if returns on the market are driven by the value or changes in the value (good and bad news) 
of rents13 or unobservable increases in the value of separable net assets, these changes will never be 
included in reported earnings.  Indeed, accounting recognizes increases in separable asset values when 
they are completely verifiable but does not recognize changes in rents, nor increases in unobservable 
separable net assets (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007).  If this is true, then the asymmetric timeliness 
approach that Basu adopts will measure conditional conservatism with error (Roychowdhury and 
Watts 2007), because of the noise introduced by the choice of the variable market returns as a measure 
of good/bad news about firms’ future earnings.  Basu’s regression approach, indeed, works only if 
returns summarize news from sources other than accounting earnings and the news can be, at least in 
                                                
12 In this framework, the objective of accounting is to assess, at a point in time, the firm’s value avail ble for interim 
distribution to the company’s claimants (shareholders, bondholders, employees, other stakeholders), and not to measure the 
market value of the shareholders’ equity.  The accounting system, as we can observe in practice, pursues this objective 
through the adoption of rules that recognize increases in separable asset values only when they are completely verifiable.  
This definition of the  object of measure is key to understanding why the variable traditionally used as a proxy of good/bad 
news about the firm’s future earnings (returns to investors) introduces noise in the assessment of conditional conservatism. 




principle, recognized in earnings in the same period (Ryan 2006).  Rents, however, are only recognized 
in the accounting system when they are acquired, not when they are generated inside the firm.  
Additionally, changes in rents are recognized only for decreases in acquired rents, and not always 
consistently (cfr. SFAS 142).   Returns, finally, may not reflect all non-accounting information 
available, may reflect good and bad news depending on the firm’s disclosure policies, or may be driven 
by the information content of earnings, creating an endogeneity problem in the Basu regression.  
Ryan’s conclusion is that: “it would be preferable to estimate asymmetric timeliness using measures of 
news other than returns” (Ryan 2006).   
The second problem with Basu’s framework has been highlighted in Dietrich et al. (2007).  They 
argue that Basu’s model, reversing the relation of accounting (reported earnings) and non-accounting 
information driving the firm’s stock price, and adopting instead accounting information as the 
dependent variable in the regression of reported earnings on changes in the firm’s stock price (returns), 
causes two types of biases: sample-variance-ratio bias and sample truncation bias.  The regression 
coefficient estimates suffer from these two biases, one arising from the regression specification and 
one arising from sampling on an endogenous and asymmetrically distributed variable (returns).  
Although those biases can be negligible, as Ryan (2006) points out, at least one of the two is related to 
the adoption of returns, an endogenous variable, as a measure of news and treated in the model as an 
independent variable.  
Ball and Shivakumar (2006), in an attempt to deal with the problem of using market returns as a 
proxy for good/bad news, adopt instead cash flow from operations as a proxy for good/bad news about 
future firm’s earnings.  However, cash flow from operations shows (i) asymmetric timeliness, (ii) is 
affected by different accounting choices, (iii) is part of earnings (causing an endogeneity problem more 
serious than the returns proxy), and (iv) is highly correlated with accruals. 
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To address these problems I adopt the number of financ al analysts’ estimates of earnings per share 
(EPS) raised/lowered over the period as a new proxy.  Every time an accounting or non-accounting 
piece of information reaches the market, financial analysts evaluate the impact of the good/bad news 
on future EPS and revise (or not) their EPS estimates.  This measure of news offers a few advantages 
over the traditional returns proxy:  
- There is no reason to believe, a priori, that the distribution of the number of analysts’ e timate 
revisions is non symmetric, which would address, partially, the issues raised by Dietrich et al. 
(2007).  Indeed, ex post, the symmetry plot of the change in analysts’ estima es suggests that the 
variable exhibits a symmetric distribution around a mean value of –1, confirmed by the skewness 
value of the distribution equal to –0.049.  
- Adopting the number of analysts’ estimate revisions i  EPS does attenuate the endogeneity 
problem of using returns as a proxy.  Changes in EPS estimates for year t+1 from one day after the 
end of the fiscal year t until the end of fiscal year t+1 should not, indeed, influence the annual 
reported earnings of year t. This will address Ryan’s suggestion (Ryan 2006) of using measures of 
news that do not involve returns, or filtering returns removing the portion in windows around 
earnings announcements to limit the endogeneity problem.  
- The number of changes in EPS estimates should be less noisy than the returns on the market in 
measuring the good/bad news.  This measure will reflect all, and only, the pieces of information 
(news) that will impact the firm’s future earnings and that will have a chance to be recorded in 
annual earnings over the years, based on the analysts’ professional judgment.  
- Finally, this addresses the concerns of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) about empiricists 
measuring the asymmetric timeliness over horizons not including the firm’s IPO, thus ignoring that 
the composition of the shareholders equity at the sart of the year influences the annual timeliness 
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measure.  The new variable that I propose to adopt is a change variable that include in its initial 
value (current forecasted EPS) all the pieces of inf rmation available at that time.  
The new approach uses the new proxy in association with a quantile (or Least Absolute Deviation) 
regression.  This allows for a more precise measure of conditional conservatism, capturing the 
underlying asymmetry in the timeliness in the recognition of good/bad news in annual reported 
earnings.  Indeed, quantile regression assumes that analysts deal with a linear loss function, trying to 
minimize their absolute forecast error instead of the square of the forecast error, as in the OLS case.14   
 
3.  Hypotheses 
3.1 New Measure of Conservatism 
The first hypothesis that I test in the paper is whether, using a different proxy for good/bad news 
within the Basu intuitive framework, I still find asymmetric timeliness in the recognition of good/bad 
news in reported earnings.  If, by adopting the new proxy, the asymmetry disappears, then Dietrich et 
al. (2007) were correct in attributing the results found with the Basu model to the econometric biases 
highlighted above.  However, if by using the new proxy (which reduces the magnitude of the two 
biases related to the adoption of returns as a proxy f r good/bad news), the asymmetric timeliness 
persists, then the asymmetric timeliness research design cannot be considered invalid.  
                                                
14 The LAD estimator, LADβ  (n-element column vector), minimizes the sum of the absolute errors.  While the OLS 
regression provides unbiased estimators of the mean of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables, the 
LAD regression (or, more generally, quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett 1978)) provides unbiased estimates of the 
median (n quantile) of the dependent variable conditional on the independent variables.  When the dependent variable and 
the model errors are distributed symmetrically and the errors are independent from the explanatory variables adopted, both 
OLS and LAD yield estimates of the same parameter vector.  In this case, researchers usually choose the stimator with the 
lower variance.  The variance of the estimator depends on the kurtosis of the error distribution.  OLS provides a lower 
variance estimator in the case of normal distribution, while the LAD estimator is characterized by lower variance with fat 
tails distributions (Basu and Markov 2004; Newey and Powell 1987).  Prior literature (Basu 1995; Frecka and Hopwood 
1983) provides evidence that scaled earnings distribution is left-skewed, which might suggest that theconditional 
distribution of the dependent variable in model (1), scaled earnings, is skewed too.   
 
13 
To test for asymmetric timeliness, I use the piecewis  regression approach of Model (1), with a 
dummy equal to one when the number of EPS revisions d wnward over the period is higher than the 
number of revisions upward, which means that over th  fiscal year, analysts received more bad news 
about future earnings than good news.  However, since the independent variable is now related to the 
analysts’ forecast revisions, a quantile regression is more appropriate than the traditional OLS 
regression.  Indeed, previous literature found that analysts seem to process public information 
regarding their earnings forecasts in a somewhat biased way, due to “analysts’ optimism” (Ramnath et 
al. 2006).  Because of their optimism, I expect analysts to overvalue the good news and include it fairly 
quickly in their forecast revisions.  Hence, upon ru ning a traditional OLS regression, I expect the 
interaction variable coefficient (1β ) in the model to be statistically equal to zero.  This analysts’ 
inefficiency disappears if, instead of an OLS regression, researchers use a quantile (or least absolute 
deviation, LAD) regression (Basu and Markov 2004).  Thus, I expect to find the interaction coefficient 
1β  positive when I run a quantile regression.  Hence, th  first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The value of the interaction variable coefficient in the model adopted (1) is 
significant and positive when I run a quantile regrssion, while not significantly different from zero 
(or even negative) when I run an OLS regression. 
 
3.2 Conditional Conservatism Determinants 
Previous literature (Watts 2003a; LaFond and Watts 2006) offers five alternative explanations for 
conservatism in financial reporting: (1) debt and managerial contracting, (2) taxation, (3) asymmetric 




The explanation for conditional conservatism due to debt contracting implies that debt-holders 
require the firm to adopt high conservative accounting standards to avoid the distribution of a firm’s 
wealth to other claimholders in case of the firm’s financial default.  If this is the correct theory to 
explain conservatism in accounting, then, all else qual, I would expect a higher conservatism for firms 
with high leverage (higher proportion of debt over equity) than for firms with low leverage.  This leads 
to the second hypothesis tested in this paper: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with high leverage exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms with low 
leverage.  
The managerial contracting theory explains the adoption of conditional conservative accounting 
standards and practice as an attempt by the shareholders to avoid overcompensating the firm’s 
managers based on future expected gains before thesgains actually translate into positive cash flow 
for the firm.  The more the executives’ compensation packages are based on the firm’s accounting 
performances, the more I would expect shareholders to ask for the adoption of more conservative 
accounting practices.  On the other hand, the more executives’ compensation packages are based on 
the firm’s accounting performances (in the form of b nuses), the more I would expect the executives to 
use aggressive accounting, recognizing expected gains more quickly than losses in earnings, to 
increase their compensation.  Then, the third hypothesis I test in the paper is: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with compensation contracts for executives highly dependent on the firm’s 
accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timel ness than firms with compensation 
contracts not based on the firm’s accounting performance .  
Previous literature (Basu 1997) also found that changes in the level of conservatism over time were 
likely due to a change in the auditors’ legal liability exposure.  When auditors are more exposed to the 
risk of being sued in relation to their work, they tend to require the client firms to be more 
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conservative.  After auditors state a going concern opi ion, then, I would expect the clients to adopt 
very rigorous conservative accounting standards, to reduce the risk of legal liability for the auditors 
and for the management.  This leads to the fourth hypot esis that I test in the paper: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms that the previous year (a) has been audited by one of the Big 7 firm, and (b)  
received a going concern opinion or a clear opinion with explanatory language from auditors 
exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than other firms in the sample. 
 
4. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
I gather market data from CRSP monthly files and accounting data from Compustat North America 
annual industrial for the period between 1963 and 2005.  Data about analysts’ EPS forecasts from 1989 
to 2005 come from the First Call database.  Data about auditors’ going-concern opinions from 2000 to 
2005 come from the Audit Analytics database.  Finally, executive compensation data from 1991 to 
2005 are taken from ExecuComp database.  
I calculate the value of earnings deflated by the beginning of the period market value, X/Pit, and 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, X/Pwinit, as earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year t, divided by the market value of equity (MktValit, equal 
to the number of shares outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199) 
for firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year t.  I compute Diff it as the difference between the sum of the 
upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm 
i over the fiscal period t (from First Call database).  Moreover, to compare the results with the Basu 
model, I calculate cumulative buy-and-hold annual returns (Rit, and winsorized at the first and 99
th 
percentile values, Rwinit) as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 
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9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal end of the year15, divided by the stock price at the 













R .  I also run the analysis calculating cumulative buy-and-hold 
annual returns for the fiscal period to make sure the results are not driven by the time horizon adopted.  
I collect compensation information for all the executives of the company from the ExecuComp 
database.  In particular, I sum for each company and each year the total salary16 (SALARYit) the total 
bonus17 (BONUSit), and other annual compensation
18 (SUMOTHit) paid to the firm’s executives.  The 
executive ratio (Exeit) is calculated as ExecuComp SALARYit + all other annual compensation 
(SUMOTHit), divided by total current compensation (SALARY+BONUS) plus all other annual 
compensation (SUMOTH) for each year and each firm.  Data are at a firm level, as I sum salary, bonus, 
and all other annual compensation for all the executives of the company for each year.  Market-to-book 
ratio (MBit) is calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided by DATA60.  Leverage (Levit) is 
calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6.  I use the total number of analysts 
following a given firm in the year (data from First Call) as a control variable in the regression.  The 
information about auditors’ opinions for each company and each year come from Compustat 
(DATA149) and from Audit Analytics (going_concern field).  As a control for heteroskedasticity, the 
OLS regressions report White t-statistics (White 1980).   
Descriptive statistics of the sample show that the sample mean of total assets is $8,971 million, the 
average market-to-book ratio is 3.50, and the average leverage ratio is 0.23.  The mean of the scaled 
net income before extraordinary items is positive (1.71), even when I winsorize the variable at the first
                                                
15 To ensure that the market reaction to a previous year’s earnings is excluded from the analysis. 
16 The dollar value of the base salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the fiscal year. 
17 The dollar value of a bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive officers during the fiscal year. 
18 This is the amount listed under “All Other Compensation” in the Summary Compensation Table.  This includes items 
such as: 1) Severance Payments; 2) Debt Forgiveness; 3) Imputed Interest; 4) Payouts for cancellation of stock options; 5) 




and 99th percentile values (0.037).  Positive is also the av r ge value of the buy and hold returns, both 
when I do not winsorize the variable (12.63%) and when I do winsorize at the first and 99th percentile 
values (10.68%),  suggesting that the companies in the sample are profitable and deliver positive return 
to investors.  The variable adopted as a proxy of go d/bad news about earnings, Diff, is symmetrically 
distributed around the mean value that is approximately –1, suggesting that, on average, there is more 
bad news than good news over the fiscal period.  For the average company, there are 15 upward and 16 
downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS estimates ov r 12 months.  These descriptive statistics for the 
sample are consistent with other recent studies (LaFond and Watts 2006).  
The correlation table, reporting Pearson correlation coefficients, shows that returns (both 
winsorized and non-winsorized) exhibit a significant positive correlation with the Diff variable, and 
with the number of upward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast. Returns, as expected, are negatively 
correlated with the downward revisions in the analysts’ EPS forecast.  The proxy variable for good/bad 
news, Diff, is positively correlated with the size of the company, as measured by total assets value 
(DATA6 of Compustat), with the scaled earnings variable aft r winsorizing (X/Pwin) and with the 
firm’s market value of equity, while it is negatively correlated with the leverage ratio (Lev).  
 
5. Research Design and Empirical Results 
I propose to analyze accounting conservatism with a model of earnings deflated by beginning-of-
period market value on the difference in the number of upward and downward revisions in analysts’ 
EPS estimates over the fiscal year (Model 1): 




itX  denotes the earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat data18) for firm i in fiscal year t; 1−itP  
is the market value of equity (number of shares outtanding times price on the market from CRSP) at 
the beginning of the fiscal year t; itDiff  is the difference between upward and downward revisions in 
the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i and period t (from First Call database); itD  is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if itDiff <0, and equal to zero otherwise. NumEstit is the number of analysts that are 
following the company throughout the year, which I adopt as a control variable to make sure a higher 
number in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts 
following it, but from the amount of good/bad news about the company’s future cash flow.  The model 
builds from Basu’s intuition of testing the different timeliness of good/bad news reported in annual 
earnings.  There are four important differences respect  to the original Basu’s model (1997).  First, I 
use the cumulative difference between the sum of the upward and the downward revisions in the 
analysts’ EPS forecast to measure good/bad news.  Second, I run a LAD regression instead of an OLS 
regression.  Third, following the findings in previous literature (Roychowdhury and Watts 2006), I 
extend the analysis to two-year and three-year timehorizons.  Fourth, I control in the regression for 
NumEstit-j,t, the number of analysts that are following the company throughout the year, as an indirect 
control of the firm’s size, or visibility. 
 
5.1 Hypothesis 1
To test the first hypothesis I estimate Model (1) winsorizing the variable Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1 and returns to 
investors at the first and 99th percentile values to reduce the influence of outliers. 19  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
                                                
19 Non-tabulated regression results for non-winsorized variables show qualitatively similar evidence. 
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I compare the results obtained estimating Model (1) using OLS and LAD regressions with the 
original Basu model/variables regression results, for the three time horizons corresponding to j=0, j=1, 
and j=2.  As expected, Table 2 shows that, when I estimate Model (1) with a pooled cross-sectional 
OLS regression, the analysts’ optimism (Ramnath et al. 2006) overcomes the conservative accounting 
standards and the model fails to detect any asymmetry in the timeliness of recognition of good/bad 
news about future earnings over the sample (interaction coefficient positive but not statistically 
different from zero) when the analysis is limited to a one year period (j=0).  Expanding the time 
horizon with an OLS regression to two and three years (j=1 and j=2) shows evidence of conditional 
conservatism (interaction coefficient β1 positive and statistically significant).  These results provide 
indirect support for expanding the time horizon to tw /three years when adopting an OLS regression, 
because, as previous literature suggested, Basu’s single-period asymmetry is just an implication of 
accounting standards requiring asymmetric verification for the recognition of good and bad news in 
accounting earnings, and not a measure of the aggregate conditional conservatism at the firm level 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2006).   
When I adopt a LAD regression, to take into consideration the linear loss function that previous 
research identified as more appropriate for financil analysts (Basu and Markov 2004; Clatwhrthy et 
al. 2006), I consistently find, as expected, a positive and significant value for the coefficient of the 
interaction term over all the time horizons (equal to 0.000289, t value of 7.31 for j=0, 0.000268, t value 
of 5.14 for j=1, and equal to 0.000260, t value of 3.93 for j=2).  Results for the LAD regression show a 
consistent presence of conditional conservatism over the three time horizons.  If I adopt the relative 
measure of asymmetry that has been used in the accounting literature since Basu (1997), calculating 
the ratio of (β1+β0)/β0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in reported annual earning 
than good news, I find that bad news is recognized n reported earnings respectively 7.1 times (for 
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j=0), 4.5 times (for j=1) and 3.0 times (for j=2) faster than good news.  There is an evident decreasing 
trend in the asymmetric timeliness20 when the analysis is extended from one to three-year horizon, 
suggesting, again, that the extension of the time horizon recommended by Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2006) is appropriate.  If I run the traditional Basu model over the sample (with returns as a proxy fr 
good/bad news), I find results consistent with the pr sence of conservatism as in the original Basu 
model, thereby indirectly validating the sample adopted in this study.   
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 
To test the hypothesis of increase in conditional conservatism associated with increase in the 
importance of debt as a source of financing for the company operations, I subdivide the sample in 
quartiles based on the leverage ratio (Levit) for firm i at time t, calculated as firm’s total debt 
(DATA9+DATA34 of Compustat) divided by total assets (DATA6 of Compustat).  Then, I measure the 
conditional conservatism in the lowest and highest quartile with Model (1) running a LAD regression 
(Table 3 Panel A and B).   
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Furthermore, I run the model, based on Model (1) with the new variable Lev, to measure the 


















                          (2) 
                                                
20 Although I do not formally run cross-equation tests for the statistical difference of the ratio values among the different 
time horizons, I do run simple F tests for a range of constant values to see which values each ratio is statistically different 
from.  This creates a confidence interval for each ratio.  The ratio of 7.1 for j=0 is statistically different from the value 3 (F 
value of 5.12, p value of 0.0237) but not statistically different from the value 4.5 (F value of 1.01, p value of 0.3143).  The 
ratio of 4.5 for j=1 is not statistically different from either 3 or 7.1 (respectively F value of 2.10, p value of 0.1470 and F 
value of 0.55, p value of 0.4596).  Finally, The ratio of 3 is statistically different (at 10% confidence level) from the value 
of 7.1 (F value of 3.60, p value of 0.0579) but not different from the value of 4.5 (F value of 1.10, p value of 0.2933). 
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where all the variables are defined above, and Levit-j,t is the leverage ratio.  Consistent with results from 
previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2006), I expect to find a higher level of conservatism (higher 
coefficient estimate for β1) from Model (1) for companies with high leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel B) 
than for companies with low leverage ratio (Table 3 Panel A). I also expect a significant and positive 
value for the estimate of the coefficient β5, in Model (2), which shows how bad news is recorded in 
annual reported earnings more quickly than good news for companies with higher leverage ratio (Table 
3 Panel C).   
Results for firms in the lowest quartile (Table 3 Panel A), with a low annual debt-to-assets ratio 
(leverage ratio mean value equal to 0.0158), show for Mdel (1) a positive and significant interaction 
coefficient estimate β1 (equal to 0.00025, T value of 1.96 for j=2), providing evid nce of conditional 
conservatism, i.e. bad news recognized in annual earnings more quickly than good news.  Results for 
firms in the highest leverage ratio quartile (Table 3 Panel B), with leverage ratio mean value of 0.5042, 
show for Model (1) an interaction coefficient estimate β1 non-statistically different from zero (-
0.000017, T value of 0.08 for j=2), exhibiting, rather surprisingly, symmetric timeliness in the 
recording of good/bad news in annual reported earnings.  For firms with high debt-to-assets ratio, then, 
there is no evidence of the use of conservative accounting, with good news recognized in annual 
reported earnings as fast as bad news.  Table 3 Panel C reports the results of the estimation of Model 
(2).  Contrary to the expectations originating from previous literature’s suggestion that debt contracting 
is an economic reason for the presence of conditional conservatism, results show a positive association 
between the level of leverage ratio and the speed of rec gnition in annual reported earnings of good 
news, instead of bad news.  Although these results are not consistent with the findings in the 
conservative accounting stream of literature (LaFond and Watts 2006; Roychowdhury and Watts 
2007), they are  consistent with results provided by the earnings management literature.  Companies 
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with a high leverage ratio (closer to default in debt provisions than companies with low leverage ratio) 
are more likely to take higher risks and “manage” earnings, through a relatively faster recognition of 
expected gains, in order to reduce the chances of not mee ing the requirements included in the debt 
indentures.  This behavior would cause a reduction in the level of conservatism in their annual reported 
earnings.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis 3 
To test the third hypothesis, I gather data from the Excutive Compensation (ExecuComp) section 
of Compustat for firms between 1992 and 2005.  First, I measure the amount of annual compensation 
that does not depend on firm accounting performance: SALARY, equal to the dollar value of the base 
salary (cash and non-cash) earned by the firm’s executive offic rs during the fiscal year and all other 
annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT), which includes items such as severance payments, debt
forgiveness, imputed interest, payouts for cancellation of stock options, payment for unused vacation, 
tax reimbursements, signing bonuses, 401K contributions, a d life insurance premiums. 
Second, I measure the amount of total current compensatio  (SALARY+BONUS) from ExecuComp 
and add all other annual compensation (ALLOTHTOT) to calculate the total annual compensation21.  
Third, I compute Exe as the ratio of SALARY+ALLOTHTOT divided by the total annual 
compensation (SALARY+BONUS+ALLOTHTOT) and use it as an index of the incentives for 
executives to use an aggressive accounting practice, re ognizing unrealized gains more quickly than 
unrealized losses in the annual reported earnings, withthe aim to increase their total annual 
compensation.  The lower the index, the higher the incentives for executives to adopt aggressive 
accounting practice.  Managers can  increase their total annual compensation, for example, by 
                                                
21 I do not use the variable total annual compensation (TDC2) from ExecuComp because TDC2 includes items such as the 
net value of stock options exercised.  The inclusion of stock options and other stock-based compensation incentives rather 
than earnings based incentive would confound my results. 
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accelerating the recognition in actual earnings of future unrealized gains, within GAAP rules.  On the 
other side of the coin, shareholders know about these incentives.  In fact, previous literature provided 
evidence that shareholders enforce more stringent conservative accounting rules as the firm executives’ 
incentives to adopt aggressive accounting practices increase (Watts 2003a, 2003b).  The aim is to 
reduce the probability of overpaying the firm’s managers.  
To test the hypothesis that firms with compensation ctracts for executives highly dependent on 
the firm’s accounting performance exhibit higher asymmetric timeliness than firms with compensation 
contracts not dependent on a firm’s performance, I adopt the following model, modifying Model (1) 
with the introduction of a new variable Exe to measure the incentives of the firm’s executives to adopt 















−−−−−−−− −                             (3) 
All the variables are defined above.  I expect to findthe coefficient of the interaction term β5 negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that, as previous literature pointed out (Watts 2003a; LaFond 
and Watts 2006), one of the determinants of conditional conservatism in accounting is its use by 
shareholders as an efficient form of firm governance, particularly in management compensation 
contracts.  The higher the executive ratio index value (Exe), the higher the portion of the total annual 
compensation that does not depend on firm accounting performances.  Hence, I would expect the 
incentives for shareholders to ask for a rigorous enforcement of conditional conservatism to decrease 
in response to the decrease in the executives’ incentives to recognize good news more quickly than bad 
news in the annual reported earnings.   
[Insert table 4 about here] 
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Table 4 shows that, contrary to the expectations, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term β5 
for Model (3) is positive and significant at 5% level in the two-year time horizon (j=1), and in the 
three-year time horizon (j=2), while it is not statistically different from zero in the one-year time 
horizon (j=0).  This provides evidence that firms implementing executive compensation more 
dependent on a firm’s accounting performances recognize unr alized gains in earnings in a more 
timely manner than losses, i.e. aggressive accounting.  The results seem to confirm the relative power 
of the firm’s executives over shareholders.  Indeed, executiv s have incentives to adopt aggressive 
accounting to increase their annual compensation package, particularly when the annual package 
heavily depends on bonuses based on the firm’s accounting performance, while shareholders have 
incentives to enforce conservative accounting rules to reduce the chances of overpaying the firm’s 
management. 
 
5.4 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 (a) and (b) tests the association between the auditors’ firm and opinion at the time t-1, 
and the level of conditional conservatism at time t.  Moreover, it tests the association between auditors’ 
going concern opinion at time t-1, t, and t+1 and the level of conditional conservatism at time t.   
Among firms with auditors’ opinion code 4, we find companies that just changed their accounting 
policies from the previous year and companies where auditors qualify their opinion with a going 
concern assumption.  Data about auditors’ opinions qualified with a going concern assumption (GCO) 
come from the Audit Analytics database.  
To test this hypothesis, I adapt Model (1) adding the new variable Code1 to test for differences in 
conditional conservatism for companies who receive a Code 1 (clear) auditor opinion with respect to 
















                                            (4) 
where all the variables are defined above and Co e1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for companies that 
received Code 1 the previous year and zero otherwise.  Indeed, no company in the sample reports an 
auditor opinion Code of 3 or 5. In fact, there are only 4 observations for companies receiving an audit 
opinion Code 2 and 7 observations for companies with unaudited financial statements (Code 0).  
[Insert Table 5 Panel A about here] 

















                                      (4b) 
Where all the variables are defined as above and the variable GCOit+j , with data from the database 
Audit Analytics between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a going concern opinion 
from the auditors: (1) one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year (j=0), or (3) will receive a going 
concern opinion the next year (j=+1), zero otherwise.  
[Insert Table 5 Panel B about here] 
Furthermore, I estimate model (5) to assess hypothesis 4 (b), whether the level of conservatism 
varies with the choice of one of the BigX audit firms vs. smaller audit firms. I introduce in Model (1) a 
variable (BigX) to characterize the companies in the sample with an audit opinion from one of the big 












+++++=−                                          (5) 
where the variables are defined as above and BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company was 
audited the previous year by one of the big 4/7 audit companies, 0 otherwise.  
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[Insert Table 5 Panel C about here] 
I would expect that, after receiving a clear opinion with explanatory language (Code 4), a company 
will exhibit a higher conditional conservatism than other companies in the sample, to lower the legal 
liability risk for the firm’s auditor and managers.  However, it should be noted that “better” companies, 
who received a clear opinion from auditors the previous year (Code 1) might already start from a 
higher level of conditional conservatism than companies that receive a clear opinion but with 
explanatory language.  In this case, indeed, the auditor acknowledges that something in the firm’s 
financial reporting might raise concerns, and feels the ne d to explain why.  I would expect, 
furthermore, that companies with aggressive accounting behaviors (recognizing annual earnings of 
expected gains faster than losses) would switch their b havior to a more rigorous accounting 
conservatism after receiving a going concern opinion from their auditors, to reduce the risk of legal 
liability for both the auditors and the management in case of bankruptcy or default on debt provisions.  
Table 5 Panel A reports the results of the estimation of Model (4) for companies that received an 
audit opinion code 1 the previous year. Panel B reports results of the estimation of Model (4b) for 
companies that received an opinion qualified with a goin  concern assumption, and Panel C reports the 
results for the LAD regression adopting Model (5).  Finally, Panel D reports the list of auditors from 
Compustat with the relative number of observations in the sample.  
There is evidence (the coefficient estimate for the interac ion coefficient β5 in Model (4) is positive 
and significant at the 10% confidence level) of more timely recognition of bad news than good news in 
reported earnings for companies that received an unqualified opinion (Code 1) than for companies that 
received an unqualified opinion with explanatory langua e.  Again, if I adopt the relative measure of 
asymmetry and calculate the ratio of (β1+β0)/β0 to measure how much faster bad news is recognized in 
reported annual earning than good news, I find that firms that received a Code 1 audit opinion 
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recognize bad news in financial statements 11.6 times faster than good news, while firms that received 
a Code 4 opinion from their auditors recognize bad news in financial statements only 3.6 times faster 
than good news22.  The results are not surprising because firms that received a clear audit opinion 
(Code 1) already exhibit a starting higher level of conditional conservatism than other firms, as shown 
when I use the contemporaneous auditor opinion variable instead of the lagged value in Model (4) 
(untabulated results).  
Table 5 Panel B reports the results for the sample of 6,282 firm-year observations, from 2000 to 
2005, with information from the Audit Analytics database about whether the auditors’ opinion has 
been qualified with the going concern assumption.  Results show that companies that in the next year 
will receive an auditor’s opinion qualified with the going concern assumption were less conservative, 
i.e. more aggressive from an accounting point of view, than the rest of the companies in the sample, 
with a coefficient β5 in column (3) negative and statistically significant, equal to –0.007 (T value of 
2.06).  In other words, these companies were recognizing unrealized gains faster than unrealized losses 
in annual earnings.  However, the accounting behavior of these firms changes the year they receive a 
going concern opinion from the auditors (and the year following it) with bad news recognized in the 
annual earnings more quickly than good news (the estimate of coefficient β5 for column 1 and 2 is 
positive and highly significant).  
Table 5 Panel C reports results for companies that hired on  of the Big 7 audit firms vs. companies 
that were audited by a smaller audit firm.  Results provide evidence of the presence of conditional 
conservatism.  Companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms (the Big 4 plus other three firms) 
recognize bad news in reported earnings two times faster than good news.  Companies who were 
audited the previous year by one of the Big 4 audit firms (untabulated results) recognize bad news in 
                                                
22 The value of the ratio of 11.6 for Code 1 companies is, at the 10% level, significantly different for the value of the ratio 
for companies receiving a Code 4 opinion from the auditors. Indeed, if I test for the difference between the value of the 
ratio of 11.6 from a constant value of 3.6, I obtain n F value of 2.94, with a p value of 0.0862.  
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reported earnings 6.2 times faster than good news.  When I compare the conservative behavior of 
companies that the previous year were audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms vs. smaller audit firms, I 
find strong evidence that companies audited by one of the Big 7 audit firms are characterized by higher 
levels of conditional conservatism than companies that were audited by smaller firms.  Indeed, the 
estimate of the interaction coefficient β5 for model (5) is positive and statistically significant 
(0.000247, T value of 2.00).  
 
6. Sensitivity Checks 
In this section I will run again a few data analyses to ensure the results in the previous section are 
not dependent on the specific methodology adopted in the paper.   
 
6.1 Fiscal Year Return 
I run the Basu model again, calculating returns over th  fiscal year instead of for the period 
between nine months before and three months after the fiscal year end.  Model (1a) is: 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDRRDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα                                       (1a) 
where all the variables are defined as in chapter 4, and Rit-1,t, is the buy-and-hold returns of the stock 
over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, calculated as the increase in 
the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting the beginning of fiscal ye r t-j and ending at 
the end of the fiscal year t, divided by the stock price at the end of the period, t-j-1.  Results, 
untabulated, are similar and consistent with the results for the Basu model described above in Chapter 




6.2 Fama-Macbeth Regression 
To check if results presented in the paper are dependent on the particular regression model adopted 
(LAD regression),  I run the analysis again adopting a Fama-Macbeth regression model, consistent 
with previous literature (LaFond and Watts 2007; Roych wdhury and Watts 2007).  This approach 
runs an OLS regression for each year across the firms in the sample, and averages the estimated 
regression coefficient over the time series considered.  As expected, since the Fama-Macbeth 
regression uses an OLS approach, results over the one-year horizon (j=0) show a non-significant 
coefficient estimate for the interaction term β1 in Model (1a), consistent with the results tabulated in 
Table 2 column (3).  
 
6.3 Change in the Cut-off Point to Create the Dummy Variable 
One of the problems previous literature (Dietrich et al. 2007) finds in the asymmetric timeliness 
approach to measuring conditional conservatism is that the sub-samples good/bad news about future 
cash flow are not created at the mean value of the proxy variable adopted.  In my findings, the mean 
value for the variable Diff  is –0.96 across the sample for the one-year, -1.95 for the two-year, and –
2.95 for the three-year time horizon.  I run the analysis redefining the dummy variable D as Dit-j,t=1 for 
Diff it<–0.96 with j=0, Dit-j,t=1 for Diff it-1,t <–1.95 with j=1, and Dit-2,t=1 for Diff it-j,t<–2.95 with j=2.
23  
When I run this analysis, I obtain results qualitatively consistent with the values presented in Chapter 
4, except for hypothesis 4.  With the new cut-off point, there is no statistical difference in the level of 
conditional conservatism between companies that in the previous year have been audited by one of the 
                                                
23 This new cut-off point does not make, in my opinion, economic sense. When a company received, over the two-year 
period, one more EPS downward forecast revision thaupward revision, even if this result is better than the average of the 
value of Diff for all the companies in the sample, it still means that the market received one more negative news about the 
firms future earnings than positive news. It would be a mistake to consider that company in the “good news” sample if we 
stick to the definition of good news as having more news about unrealized gains than losses. 
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big 4/7 audit firms and the other companies in the sample (interaction coefficient β5 in Model (5) is 
equal to 0,00002, T value equal to 0.2).  
 
7. Conclusion and Future Research 
Following Basu’s (1997) seminal work, accounting literau e adopted the Basu single-period model 
to measure conditional conservatism.  However, the proxy chosen to measure the arrival of good/bad 
news about firms’ future earnings, the price of the stock, can vary due to factors that will never  be 
recorded in firms’ reported earnings over the years.  This unreliability introduces economic and 
econometric biases into the analysis (Dietrich et al. 2007) and causes inaccuracy in the measure of 
conditional conservatism.  To overcome the problem, I introduce a new measure of conditional 
conservatism, applying a Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) piecewise regression and adopting the 
number of changes in financial analysts’ EPS forecasts as a proxy for good/bad news about future 
earnings and extending the analysis to two-year and three-year time horizons. 
Results of the paper provide evidence supporting the rec nt results obtained adopting a modified 
version of the Basu measure,  confuting the conceptual and econometric criticism to the Basu model, 
mainly by Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007).  The study provides evidence that that (1) companies 
characterized by a high debt-to-asset ratio, contrary to expectations, recognize good news about future 
earnings as quickly as bad news.  Additionally (2) companies with executives compensated more 
heavily based on the company’s accounting performances do consistently exhibit an aggressive 
accounting behavior, recognizing expected gains in annu l earnings faster than losses.  Furthermore 
(3a) companies that in the previous year were audited by one of the big 7 audit and (3b) firms that 
received an unqualified auditor opinion without explanatory language show a more conditional 
conservative behavior than the rest of the sample.  Finally, over a reduced sample of 6,282 firm-year 
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observations, I find that companies receiving an auditors’ opinion qualified with the going concern 
assumption applied an aggressive accounting behavior in the year prior to the going concern opinion 
but became highly conservative in the year the qualified opinion was issued and the following year.   
Future avenues of research include further testing the conditional conservative determinants 
highlighted by previous literature with the new measure based on Model (1).  Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to apply the new measure of conditional conservatism described in this paper to analyze the 
interaction and the preemptive role of unconditional and conditional conservatism, as highlighted in 
recent literature (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Ryan 2006).  Finally, the adoption of a different regression 
model that allows for asymmetric loss function should be explored.  Indeed, it is not clear what form of 
loss function investors and financial analysts face.  If, as it might be likely, they are more concerned 
with overestimated than underestimated earnings, then a linear or square loss function may not be the 
appropriate form to use because they both reflect symmetric losses.  How to specify a plausible and 
non arbitrary asymmetric loss function, however, is not clear.  One possible solution is to follow the 
method developed first by Elliot (2003), who illustrates a general class of asymmetric loss functions 
nesting the symmetric linear and the quadratic loss functio s.  With such a general model, which 
encompasses different forms of loss functions, researchers will not be constrained by assumptions 
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Table 1 Panel A Summary Statistics 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
X/P 17656 1.717104 191.9707 -10.79757 25285.71 
X/Pwin 17656 .0366615 .1036586 -.571178 .2420474 
Diff 21201 -.9603321 26.24441 -238 204 
foreup 21201 15.6253 21.50789 0 245 
foredown 21201 16.58563 22.4067 0 278 
R 18787 .1263371 .6991903 -1 27.29412 
Rwin 18787 .106855 .5175039 -.7849463 2.421277 
SALARY 21201 2180.806 18597.96 0 2705195 
BONUS 21201 1904.259 3980.28 0 196710.9 
SUMOTH 21201  485.5704 4622.145 -111.731 603851.9 
Lev 20864 .2331752 .9548152 0 135.25 
MB 19989 3.503217 42.40155 -876.9447 5603.074 
MktVal 19990 5270.543 18168.66 .0325 467092.9 
data6 20963 8971.586 43301.18 0 1291803 
data25 20818 136.1432 419.1405 0 10862 
 
Where:  
X/Pit, and X/Pwinit (winsorized at the first and 99
th percentile values) is the value of earning deflated by the beginning 
of the period market value, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18) for firm i in fiscal year 
t, divided by the market value of equity (MktValit  equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times 
price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diff it is the difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the 
downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i over the fiscal period t (from First Call database).  
Rit, and Rwinit (winsorized at the first and 99
th percentile values) is the buy-and-hold annual returns, calculated as the 
increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over the period starting 9 months before and ending 3 months after the fiscal 













R .  SALARYit is the sum of the 
total salary,  BONUSit is the sum of the total bonus, and SUMOTHit is the sum of all other annual compensation paid to the 
executives for firms i in year t.  Levit is the leverage ratio and it is calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by 
DATA6 for each firm and each year.  MBit is the Market-to-book ratio calculated as Compustat DATA25*DATA199, divided 
by DATA60. Finally, data6it is the total value of assets and data25it is the number of shares outstanding for each company i 
in year t, from Compustat.  
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Table 1 Panel B Correlation Table  
 
 X/P X/Pwin Diff f_up f_down R Rwin SALARY BONUS SUMOTH Lev MB MktVal  data6 data25 
X/P 1.000               
                
X/Pwin 0.018 1.000              
 (0.015)               
Diff -0.024 0.207 1.000             
 (0.001) (0.000)              
f_up -0.003 0.124 0.575 1.000            
 (0.691) (0.000) (0.000)             
f_down 0.026 -0.125 -0.619 0.286 1.000           
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)            
R 0.002 0.129 0.151 0.054 -0.126 1.000          
 (0.797) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
Rwin 0.003 0.171 0.188 0.076 -0.150 0.871 1.000         
 (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
SALARY -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.029 0.020 0.001 0.003 1.000        
 (0.945) (0.608) (0.341) (0.000) (0.004) (0.859) (0.651)         
BONUS -0.003 0.120 0.150 0.301 0.113 0.012 0.022 0.023 1.000       
 (0.685) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.003) (0.001)        
SUMOTH -0.002 -0.013 -0.009 0.094 0.101 -0.014 -0.013 0.016 0.146 1.000      
 (0.803) (0.089) (0.185) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.072) (0.019) (0.000)       
Lev -0.006 -0.131 -0.032 -0.006 0.032 -0.015 -0.019 0.000 0.021 0.010 1.000     
 (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.046) (0.011) (0.982) (0.002) (0.148)      
MB -0.004 -0.027 0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.022 0.029 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001 1.000    
 (0.626) (0.000) (0.187) (0.193) (0.775) (0.003) (0.000) (0.993) (0.860) (0.748) (0.940)     
MktVal 0.006 0.036 0.109 0.339 0.201 -0.021 -0.019 0.023 0.312 0.151 -0.004 0.016 1.000   
 (0.453) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.566) (0.024)    
data6 0.008 0.068 0.038 0.195 0.143 -0.017 -0.016 0.017 0.484 0.126 0.023 -0.004 0.425 1.000  
 (0.268) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.026) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.601) (0.000)   
data25 0.010 -0.009 0.033 0.333 0.282 -0.041 -0.046 0.024 0.278 0.157 -0.003 0.009 0.840 0.357 1.000 
 (0.172) (0.244) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.692) (0.202) (0.000) (0.000)  
 




Table 2 Hypothesis 1 
 
LAD and OLS:  tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα   
and Basu: tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDRRDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα  
 
 (1) LAD j=0 (2) OLS j=0 (3) Basu j=0 (4) LAD j=1 (5)OLS j=1 (6)Basu j=1 (7)LAD j=2 (8)OLS j=2 (9)Basu j=2 
D -0.015904 -0.033642 0.018729 -0.023991 -0.050599 0.036636 -0.025886 -0.056992 -0.006039 
 (16.95)** (16.70)** (7.98)** (12.98)** (13.02)** (7.51)** (8.64)** (9.62)** (1.14) 
Diff/ [R] 0.000047 0.000374 [-0.005015] 0.000075 0.000350 [-0.018171] 0.000128 0.000346 [-0.009125] 
 (1.78) (9.53)** (2.00)* (2.23)* (7.09)** (8.53)** (3.04)** (5.71)** (2.20)* 
Diff*D/[R]*D 0.000289 0.000060 [0.201470] 0.000268 0.000259 [0.263361] 0.000260 0.000417 [0.022782] 
 (7.31)** (0.82) (21.74)** (5.14)** (2.51)* (17.42)** (3.93)** (3.25)** (2.62)** 
NumEst -0.000328 0.000129 0.000174 -0.000437 0.000477 0.000379 -0.000486 0.000622 0.000462 
 (3.99)** (0.84) (1.26) (4.64)** (2.72)** (2.19)* (4.42)** (3.17)** (2.39)* 
Constant 0.066130 0.053636 0.053705 0.127787 0.098705 0.100208 0.186367 0.141826 0.111801 
 (91.81)** (37.13)** (37.32)** (82.41)** (32.72)** (32.08)** (70.51)** (28.70)** (20.03)** 
Observations 17656 17656 17646 13548 13548 11995 10302 10302 9062 
[Pseudo] R Square [0.034] 0.059 0.097 [0.025] 0.053 0.066 [0.022] 0.050 0.003 
For OLS regression, robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at 
the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where 
market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit-j,t is the 
cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i 
between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t  is the number of 
analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  For the OLS models based on Basu framework, (model 3, 6, and 9), Rit-j,t, is the buy-and-hold 
returns of the stock over fiscal years t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values, calculated as the increase in the price of stock (Pit, from CRSP) over 
the period starting 9 months before the beginning of fiscal year t-j and ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal yer t, divided by the stock price at the 
beginning of the period, t-j-1,  and Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Rit-j,t<0, equal to zero otherwise.  Columns (1), (2), and(3) report results for the 1 year 
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LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu model regression.  Columns (4), (5), and (6) report results for the 2 year LAD regression, OLS regression and Basu 





Table 3 Hypothesis 2 
tjittjittjittjittjittjittjit NumEstDDiffDiffDPX ,2,,1,0,101,1, */ −−−−−−−−− ++++= βββαα  
 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel A Low Leverage Group Mean Lev=0.0158  
 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.016892 -0.023323 -0.029246 
 (10.55)** (6.21)** (5.93)** 
Diff -0.000061 0.000075 0.000060 
 (1.39) (1.11) (0.84) 
Diff*D  0.000319 0.000110 0.000250 
 (4.42)** (0.94) (1.96)* 
NumEst -0.000891 -0.001099 -0.001149 
 (6.19)** (5.65)** (6.15)** 
Constant 0.060561 0.114899 0.168393 
 (53.22)** (38.92)** (41.29)** 
Observations 4434 3372 2494 
Pseudo R Square 0.035 0.023 0.029 
 
Table 3 Hypothesis 2 Panel B High Leverage Group  Mean Lev=0.5042 
 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.019893 -0.032671 -0.028973 
 (8.90)** (6.60)** (3.06)** 
Diff 0.000380 0.000598 0.000699 
 (4.81)** (5.32)** (4.37)** 
Diff*D 0.000064 -0.000065 -0.000017 
 (0.61) (0.43) (0.08) 
NumEst -0.000058 0.000308 0.000204 
 (0.27) (1.11) (0.53) 
Constant 0.065021 0.123288 0.179368 
 (35.77)** (28.06)** (20.29)** 
Observations 4171 3107 2331 
Pseudo R square 0.040 0.039 0.035 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The tables present result of LAD regressions estimated over the 1992-2005 time horizon. The low and high leverage 
groups represent the first (lowest) and the fourth (highest) quartile of firms ranked annually on the leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) 
calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each year.  Panel A report the results of 
the LAD regression for companies in the lowest quartile while panel B report the results for companies in the highest 
quartile.  The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period 
market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity 
(MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199.  
Diff it-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the downward revisions 
(f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call database).  Dit-j,t is a 
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dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t  is the number of analyst that are following 
the company throughout the year.   
 
41 





















 (1)LAD j=0 (2)LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D -0.012102 -0.019229 -0.017313 
 (9.87)** (7.72)** (4.00)** 
Diff -0.000151 -0.000094 -0.000128 
 (4.73)** (2.97)** (2.29)* 
Lev 0.007795 0.035253 0.072238 
 (2.63)** (5.59)** (6.27)** 
Diff*D 0.000455 0.078746 0.000290 
 (8.94)** (25.66)** (3.03)** 
Lev*D -0.017043 -0.026517 -0.044621 
 (4.06)** (2.93)** (2.78)** 
Lev*Diff 0.001238 0.001325 0.001658 
 (10.35)** (9.26)** (7.72)** 
Lev*Diff*D -0.001137 0.000110 -0.000682 
 (6.55)** (0.70) (2.02)* 
NumEst -0.000381 -0.000512 -0.000550 
 (5.34)** (6.75)** (5.65)** 
Constant 0.064295 0.127512 0.172233 
 (74.51)** (69.10)** (52.45)** 
Observations 17541 13404 10175 
Pseudo R square 0.038 0.043 0.030 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period 
market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity 
(MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat 
DATA199.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the 
downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call 
database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise.  The leverage ratio (Levit-j,t) is 
calculated as Compustat DATA9+DATA34, divided by DATA6 for each firm and each year.  For j=1, it’s the avr ge 
of the leverage ratio over the two-year period, andfor j=2 it’s the average of the leverage ratio for the company for 



























 (1) LAD j=0 (2) LAD j=1 (3)LAD j=2 
D 0.002629 0.003980 0.001075 
 (0.80) (0.55) (0.09) 
Diff 0.000036 0.000218 0.000406 
 (0.52) (2.16)* (3.05)** 
Exe -0.054391 -0.114888 -0.073033 
 (16.80)** (15.53)** (13.64)** 
Diff*D 0.000325 -0.000037 -0.000225 
 (2.88)** (0.22) (0.97) 
Exe*D -0.020689 -0.035600 -0.016487 
 (4.46)** (3.44)** (2.16)* 
Exe*Diff -0.000090 -0.000339 -0.000265 
 (0.74) (1.94) (2.72)** 
Exe*D*Diff -0.000026 0.000504 0.000353 
 (0.16) (2.00)* (2.37)* 
NumEst -0.000717 -0.000896 -0.001015 
 (9.32)** (10.33)** (10.09)** 
Constant 0.101810 0.206789 0.307979 
 (47.32)** (41.96)** (36.91)** 
Observations 17656 13603 10419 
Pseudo R square 0.0574 0.0542 0.0623 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit-j,t/Pit-j-1,t-1, is the cumulative value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period 
market value during year t-j to t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity 
(MktValit) is equal to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat 
DATA199.  Diffit-j,t is the cumulative difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit-j,t) and the sum of the 
downward revisions (f_downit-j,t) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for firm i between fiscal year t-j and t (from First Call 
database).  Dit-j,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it-j,t <0, equal to zero otherwise.  The executive ratio (Exeit-j,t) is 
calculated as ExecuComp SALARY + all other annual compensation (SUMOTH), divided by total current 
compensation (SALARY+BONUS) + all other annual compensation (SUMOTH) for each year.  Data are at firm 
level, as I sum the salary, all other annual compensation, and total annual compensation for all the executives in the 
company for each year.  For j=1, it’s the average of the executive ratio over the two-year period, andfor j=2 it’s the 
average of the executive ratio for the company for the three-year period.  NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the number of 
analyst that are following the company throughout the year, that I adopt as a control variable to make sur  a higher 
number in the variable Diff is not coming from the size of the company or the number of analysts following it, but 
from the number of good/bad news about the company future earnings.  
 
43 


















 (1) LAD Code1 vs. Code4 t value 
D -0.015576  (12.00)** 
Diff 0.000119  (3.35)** 
Code1 -0.005365  (4.45)** 
Diff*D 0.000227  (4.49)** 
Code1*D -0.00088  (0.51) 
Code1*Diff -0.000112  (2.49)** 
Code1*D*Diff 0.000105  (1.65) 
NumEst -0.000326  (4.34)** 
Constant 0.069289  (72.50)** 
Observations 17656  
Pseudo R Square 0.036  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value for 
year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the 
number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the 
difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ 
EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it <0, 
equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit-j,t, finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the 
year.  
Audit opinion codes are: 
0. Financial statements are unaudited  
1. Unqualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect no unresolvable restrictions and auditor has no significa t 
exceptions as to the accounting principles, the consistency of their application, and the adequacy of 
information disclosed  
2. Qualified Opinion. Financial statements reflect the effects of some limitation on the scope of the 
examination or some unsatisfactory presentation of financial information, but are otherwise presented 
fairly. We assign this code when a company is in the process of liquidating (even if opinion is not acually 
qualified) or when an opinion states that the financi l statements do not present fairly the financial position 
of the company  
3. Disclaimer of or No Opinion. Auditor refuses to express an opinion regarding the company’s ability to 
sustain operations as a going concern  
4. Unqualified Opinion With Explanatory Language. Auditor has expressed an unqualified opinion regarding 
the financial statements but has added explanatory language to the auditor’s standard report  
5. Adverse Opinion. Auditor has expressed an adverse  
 
Columns (1) reports the results of the LAD regression for companies that received an auditor opinion cde 1 vs. 
code 4 at time t-1.  No company in the sample reports a code equal to 3 or 5, and there are only 4 observations for 
companies receiving an audit opinion code 2 and 7 observation for companies with unaudited financial st tements 



























(3) One Year Ahead 
(j=+1) 
D -0.017657 -0.017113 -0.017428 
 (10.28)** (10.32)** (10.28)** 
Diff 0.000115 0.000116 0.000119 
 (2.97)** (3.11)** (3.10)** 
GCO -0.350510 -0.381728 -0.065795 
 (21.88)** (22.32)** (1.56) 
Diff*D 0.000127 0.000130 0.000119 
 (2.10)* (2.23)* (1.99)* 
GCO*D 0.222471 0.023430 -0.300983 
 (9.05)** (1.11) (6.71)** 
GCO*Diff -0.017224 -0.021131 0.006607 
 (20.93)** (3.40)** (1.91) 
GCO*Diff*D 0.041935 0.026000 -0.007147 
 (27.47)** (4.18)** (2.06)* 
NumEst -0.000420 -0.000423 -0.000428 
 (3.25)** (3.40)** (3.35)** 
Constant 0.061399 0.061391 0.061214 
 (46.65)** (48.38)** (47.19)** 
Observations 6282 6282 6282 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where:  
The dependent variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value for 
firm i in year t, winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary 
items (Compustat DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal 
to the number of share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the 
difference between  the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ 
EPS forecast for firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it <0, 
equal to zero otherwise.  NumEstit, is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  
GCOit+j , from the database Audit Analytics between 2000 and 2005, is equal to 1 if the firm i received a going 
concern opinion from the auditors: (1) one year before (j=-1), (2) the same year (j=0), or (3) will receive a going 
concern opinion the next year (j=+1), zero otherwise.  
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Pseudo R Square 0.039 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Where: 
BigX includes the following audit firms: Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte in the 
United Kingdom since April 29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse on July 1, 1998), Ernst 
& Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and Ernst prior to July 1, 1979), 
Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989; Haskins & Sells prior to May 1, 1978), 
Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prior to April 1, 1987) (known as KPMG internationally), and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1, 1998 merger with Coopers & Lybrand). The dependent 
variable, Xit/Pi,t-1, is the value of earning deflated by the beginning of the period market value for firm i in year t, 
winsorized at the first and 99th percentile values.  It is calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
DATA18), divided by the market value of equity, where market value of equity (MktValit) is equal to the number of 
share outstanding, Compustat DATA25, times price per share, Compustat DATA199).  Diffit is the difference between  
the sum of the upward (f_upit) and the sum of the downward revisions (f_downit) in the analysts’ EPS forecast for 
firm i in fiscal year t (from First Call database).  Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Diff it <0, equal to zero 
otherwise.  BigX is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm was audited by one of the big 7 audit firms the previous 
year, 0 otherwise.  NumEstit, finally, is the number of analyst that are following the company throughout the year.  
Column (1) reports the results of the estimation of the model for companies with one of the Big 7 auditors at year t-1 




Table 5 Hypothesis 4 Panel D Auditors from Compustat DATA149 
 
Code Auditor # Obs. 
0  Unaudited  19 
1  Arthur Andersen  2299 
2  Arthur Young (prior to October 1, 1989) (merged with Ernst & Whinney on October 
1, 1989)  
0 
3  Coopers & Lybrand (Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte in the United Kingdom since April 
29, 1990) (Coopers & Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse on July 1, 1998)  
939 
4  Ernst & Young (Ernst & Whinney from July 1, 1979 to September 29, 1989; Ernst and 
Ernst prior to July 1, 1979)  
4232 
5  Deloitte & Touche (Deloitte, Haskins & Sells prior to December 4, 1989; Haskins & 
Sells prior to May 1, 1978)  
2995 
6  Peat, Marwick, Main (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell prio  to April 1, 1987) (known as 
KPMG internationally)  
2614 
7  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (Price Waterhouse prior to July 1, 1998 merger with 
Coopers & Lybrand)  
3784 
8  Touche Ross (merged with Deloitte, Haskins & Sells on December 4, 1989)  0 
9  Other  115 
10  Altschuler, Melvoin, and Glasser  0 
11  BDO Seidman (Seidman and Seidman prior to September 1, 1988  118 
12  Baird, Kurtz, and Dobson  3 
13  Cherry, Bekaert, and Holland  0 
14  Clarkson, Gordon  0 
15  Clifton, Gunderson  0 
16  Crowe Chizek  0 
17  Grant Thornton  144 
18  J.H. Cohn  0 
19  Kenneth Leventhal  0 
20  Laventhol and Horwath  0 
21  McGladrey & Pullen (McGladrey, Hendrickson, and Pullen prior to May 1988)  19 
22  Moore Stephens  2 
23  Moss Adams  2 
24  Pannell Kerr Forster (Pannell, Kerr, MacGillivray in Canada)  3 
25  Plante and Moran  0 
26  Richard A. Eisner  6 
27  Spicer and Oppenheim  0 
 Missing value 3907 
 
 
